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• Central banks resort to quantitative easing
when the normal monetary policy tool of low-
ering the short-term interest rate is con-
strained. This constraint typically arises from
the zero-lower bound, ie the reluctance to cut
nominal rates below zero. This can result in a
real interest rate that, while negative, is still too
high for an economy to quickly find its way
back to full employment and equilibrium. Many
indicators such as the low inflation rate, high
unemployment rates, the current account sur-
plus and high savings compared to weak
investment suggest that the euro area is in
such a situation.
• Quantitative easing attempts to address this
situation through three different channels: low-
ering long-term interest rates to improve invest-
ment conditions and disincentivise savings
(interest rate channel); purchasing relatively
safe long-term assets thereby driving investors
into riskier investments (portfolio rebalancing
channel); and weakening the exchange rate
(exchange rate channel).
• The main criticisms of the European Central
Bank’s sovereign QE programme are that it is (i)
unlawful in a monetary union without a joint
treasury; (ii) ineffective and/or unnecessary;
and (iii) associated with negative side effects
in terms of financial stability and inequality.
The design of the programme has dealt with the
first criticism. This briefing focuses on the
second criticism.
• We argue that the ECB’s QE programme is nec-
essary given the general macroeconomic situ-
ation and the continuing weak inflation
dynamics in the euro area. But the continu-
ously weak inflation dynamics have raised
doubts about its effectiveness. 
• Assessing the effectiveness of QE is difficult
without a counter-factual, but we show that QE
had a strong effect on the exchange rate chan-
nel, weakening the euro-dollar exchange rate
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substantially. We also show that long-term
interest rates fell substantially in anticipation
of the programme. In relation to portfolio rebal-
ancing, we show that banks have not shed sov-
ereign debt from their balance sheets at a
significant scale so the purchases have been
from different parties. We show that investment
has picked up slightly, housing markets in
some countries have gained strength but credit
creation is only slightly increasing. Finally, we
show that the expansion of the ECB’s Public
Sector Purchase Programme in March 2016 has
had no visible effect on any variable.
• We document that QE has reduced the prof-
itability of banks by narrowing their margins.
The recent corporate QE, while lowering corpo-
rate yields, is further reducing margins for
banks.
• We argue that further monetary policy meas-
ures are unlikely to bring strong benefits. One
sensible avenue for monetary policy could be
to enact the sovereign bond purchases from
banks in order to reduce the exposure of banks
to sovereign debt. More important, however, is
government action. In particular, reducing the
debt overhang, tackling banking fragilities and
introducing reforms to create new business
opportunities and fiscal measures in countries
with fiscal space would help speed the recov-
ery and increase inflation.  
1  introDuCtion
The decision to start quantitative easing in the
euro area has been highly controversial. After a
long period of deliberation, the European Central
Bank decided in January 2015 on a sovereign QE
programme that was implemented from March
2015 with monthly purchases of €44 billion. The
amount purchased was increased in March 2016. 
The controversy over QE now is less about
whether the ECB is empowered to use a monetary
policy instrument that most central banks in
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advanced economies have used. It is rather about
whether QE is effective as a tool to increase infla-
tion to the target. In addition, there is increasing
concern that QE and other non-conventional mon-
etary policy measures produce unintended con-
sequences in terms of financial instability or in
terms of wealth inequality.
Central banks resort to QE when the nominal short-
term interest rate falls to zero. The so-called zero
lower bound prevents central banks from reduc-
ing the nominal interest rate below zero. Central
banks cannot lower the rate much below zero
because households and corporations would shift
their savings to cash, which would generate a
return above the rate set by the central bank. 
When the short-term nominal interest rate reaches
zero, the real interest rate of the economy is set
by the inflation rate. If inflation is low, this real rate
may be well above the level at which the economy
returns to equilibrium, unemployment is signifi-
cantly reduced and output reaches its potential. A
low inflation environment with the nominal rate at
zero therefore risks creating an economy with high
and sustained unemployment.
Quantitative easing attempts to address this prob-
lem by lowering the nominal long-term interest
rate and by pushing investors into riskier asset
classes. The lower long-term interest rate should
encourage savers to save less and shift towards
consumption, and investors to take advantage of
the lower long-term funding cost to fund invest-
ment (which is in term more profitable). Moreover,
by purchasing sovereign bonds, the central bank
forces investors to buy other, riskier assets, which
in turn should stimulate activity. The increased liq-
uidity should weaken the exchange rate thereby
supporting the recovery. Finally, more targeted QE
can remove weak assets from balance sheets,
contributing to deleveraging (Woodford, 2012).
But the effectiveness of monetary policy depends
on economic circumstances. While arguably infla-
tion is a monetary phenomenon in the long run,
the effectiveness of monetary measures in the
short to medium run depends on broader macro-
economic circumstances. 
The euro area suffered from a number of shocks
and a weak starting position that led to particularly
strong disinflationary pressures. In principle,     the
process of disinflation – itself the result of poor
aggregate demand conditions – that the euro area
is experiencing is the result of the following fac-
tors:
• Deleveraging: most countries have at least one
sector in their economy that built up levels of
excessive debt prior to 2008. Reducing the
debt overhang weakens demand and as a con-
sequence there is downward pressure   on
prices. Debt deleveraging in the euro area has
been undertaken comparatively slowly
(Ahearne and Wolff, 2012; Ruscher and Wolff,
2012).
• A fragile banking system is a further factor
hampering the effective transmission of mon-
etary policy to the euro area. Mody and Wolff
(2015) show the significant weaknesses of the
euro area’s banks and in particular the still high
non-performing exposures. The currently ongo-
ing resolution of banking problems in Italy illus-
trates the slow clean-up of the banks.
Schoenmaker and Véron (2016) argue that the
new European banking supervisor is tough and
addresses the weaknesses, but that problems
have not yet been fully resolved.
• Risks and uncertainty: a variety of economic,
regulatory and geopolitical risks have emerged
across the euro area and beyond. Banks are
reluctant to invest in new activities, and corpo-
rates and households are reining in consump-
tion and investment. The risk of the break-up of
the euro area had one of the biggest negative
effects on confidence and investment.
• Negative feedback between low growth/infla-
tion and debt: The process of deleveraging
becomes increasingly difficult as it progresses.
The decline in output and prices that delever-
aging causes reduces the scope for further
deleveraging. It is exactly for this reason that
those countries with the greatest deleveraging
needs find it the hardest to reduce their debts.
• Finally, fiscal and structural policies play a cen-
tral role in supporting growth and thereby help-
ing the ECB to achieve its inflation target. In the
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euro area, fiscal policies have often dampened
demand or have turned slightly expansionary
only this year. In turn, progress with structural
reforms that could provide incentives for new
investment has been slow in the euro area’s
biggest three economies. Arguably, monetary
policy has been insufficiently supported by
other policies (Fratzscher et al, 2016).
The euro area was in need of a quantitative easing
programme. Growth was low, inflation dynamics
were weak with repeated downward revisions,
savings were high and investment was meagre,
falling well below pre-crisis investment trends.
Overall, the signs of demand weakness were
overwhelming pointing to a need for more stimu-
lating monetary policies. But how effective has the
ECB’s QE programme been in stimulating demand
and increasing inflation? Would increasing QE
support the euro area or is the marginal benefit of
QE limited? Has QE introduced new risks to the
economy? We tackle these questions by review-
ing the decisions behind QE, by discussing the
macroeconomic implications of QE, and the chan-
nels through which it is transmitted, and by
assessing the potential risks arising from aggres-
sive monetary policy. 
2    tHe eCB’s unConventional MonetarY
poliCY: WHat is it anD WHat Does it Do?
On 22 January 2015 the European Central Bank
(ECB) announced the Public Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (PSPP), an expansion of the Asset Pur-
chase Programme (APP). Under the PSPP, the
Eurosystem started in March 2015 to purchase
sovereign bonds from euro-area governments and
debt securities from European institutions and
national agencies. This new programme supple-
mented two other asset-purchase programmes
already in place within the APP: the Asset-Backed
Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP, which
started in November 2014) and the third Covered
Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3, which started
in October 2014).
On 3 December 2015, ECB president Mario Draghi
announced an extension of the PSPP. While it was
initially planned to last until at least September
2016, it was extended until at least March 2017.
President Draghi said that the asset purchase
programme would continue “until we see a  sus-
tained convergence towards our objective of a rate
of inflation which is below but close to 2 percent”.
Additionally, regional and local government bonds
were added to the list of eligible assets for pur-
chase.
Finally, on 10 March 2016 the ECB announced a
further expansion of the APP: the combined
monthly amount purchased was increased from
€60 billion to €80 billion, and the new Corporate
Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP), which
involves the purchase of investment-grade
euro-denominated bonds issued by non-bank
corporations established in the euro area, was
added. Details of the amount of corporate bonds
to be purchased every month were not given, but
the ECB indicated that the CSPP would not lead to
a higher amount of monthly purchases under the
APP as a whole, thereby indicating that corporate
bond purchases will be made at the expense of
one or more of the three other programmes
already in place. Figure 1 plots the monthly vol-
umes of assets purchased so far under the three
existing programmes: the ECB has purchased
about €1 billion per month under the ABSPP,
almost €10 billion under CBPP3, and €50 billion
under the PSPP (before this was raised to about
€79 billion in April 2016).
Interestingly, Hüttl and Merler (2016) have shown
that the increase in the Eurosystem’s holdings of
euro-area government bonds has not been
matched by a corresponding reduction in the
amounts of these bonds on euro-area banks’
balance sheets. This is corroborated by ECB data
on bank balance sheets, which shows that bank
government bond holdings have gone down by
€82 billion since the start of the PSPP, compared to
the €726 billion currently being held by the
Eurosystem (see Figure 2). This suggests that
government bonds purchased under the PSPP
have mostly been purchased from non-bank
entities and foreign banks.
Figure 3 shows that the ECB’s main refinancing
operations rate was gradually lowered in response
to the Great Recession, until it reached zero in
March 2016.
However, QE can become less effective as the
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purchase programme continues. It can also
increase inequality (Claeys, Darvas and Leandro,
2015) and undermine financial stability (Claeys
and Darvas, 2015), especially as the policy
continues to be implemented over a longer period.
Additionally, the untested nature of such
unconventional monetary policies makes it much
harder to calibrate them in order to obtain the
desired increase in aggregate demand, especially
if they go on for a long period. 
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figure 1: Monthly purchases under the three app purchase programmes of the eCB (€ billions)
Source: European Central Bank.
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figure 2: Government bond holdings of euro-area monetary and ﬁnancial institutions (€ billions) 
Source: European Central Bank. Notes: 1) “Whatever it takes’’*; 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and
expansion of PSPP. * “Whatever it takes” refers to the speech given by ECB President Draghi in July 2012, in which he vowed
to do whatever it takes to safeguard the ﬁnancial stability of the euro area. See
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html.
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figure 3: the european Central Bank main reﬁnancing operations rate (%)
Source: European Central Bank.
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1. Maria Demertzis and
Nicola Viegi (2016) ‘Are
central bank(er)s still credi-
ble?’ Bruegel Blog, 14 June.
visible also recently in the US, might be a reflec-
tion of increased uncertainty. Market expectations
are quicker to follow actual inflation (even at
longer horizons) because they attempt to also
capture perceptions about risk and therefore
hedge against them. Survey expectations on the
other hand, reflect an opinion about inflation
reaching its target in the relevant horizon and are
therefore arguably more a measure of policymak-
ers’ ability to deliver.  
A formal measure of credibility1 shows that both
the Federal Reserve and the ECB have been able to
remain credible during the financial crisis that
started in 2008. However, while the Fed has only
seen a temporary decrease in credibility that was
recovered almost in full subsequently, the ECB
has not been able to regain the credibility it has
lost. Arguably since inflation in the two areas has
been very similar in the last eight years, the dif-
ference in the way the credibility of the Fed and
ECB has changed is arguably the result of the dif-
ferent macroeconomic policy mixes applied.
Therefore, also factors largely outside the control
of the ECB have affected its credibility.
3.2 The real effects of QE: GDP, investment and
unemployment
Euro-area real GDP fell for seven consecutive quar-
ters starting in 2012: the second dip of the euro
area’s double-dip recession (Figure 6). Since then,
GDP has grown moderately, reaching a peak of
around 2 percent following the start of the ECB’s
PSPP. The latest data shows a drop in GDP growth
to 1.7 percent during 2016 Q1. Household con-
sumption, investment and to a lesser extent fiscal
expenditure have been the main drivers of growth
in the last quarters. 
For the recovery to be stronger, a bigger increase
in investment would be desirable. Gross capital
formation has picked up slightly after a period of
continuous decline throughout 2012 and 2013
(Figure 7). Annual investment growth has been
positive since 2014 Q1, reaching a peak of 3.9 per-
cent in 2015 Q4, the penultimate quarter of avail-
able data. It is unclear whether the start of the
PSPP had any impact.
One possible explanation of why expansionary
3  tHe effeCts of Quantitative easinG
Analysing the effects of QE is a difficult task.    Its
effectiveness can only be assessed against a
benchmark that is unknown, the so-called coun-
terfactual. What would have the developments in
inflation, employment and GDP been if the          ECB
had not embarked on QE? In this section, we show
simple charts documenting developments in key
macroeconomic and financial variables around
the dates of major decisions by the ECB on both
QE and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)
programme.
3.1  Inflation and inflation expectations
January 2015, the month of the announcement
of the PSPP, was the month with the lowest rate of
inflation in the euro area ever, -0.6 percent (Figure
4). Thereafter, year-on-year inflation reached a
peak of 0.3 percent in May 2015, the third month
of government bond purchases. Since then,
monthly inflation has drifted between -0.1 percent
and 0.3 percent, falling to -0.2 percent in April
2016, and -0.1 percent in May. This is still far from
the ECB’s target of close to but below 2 percent,
and data for recent months points to a deteriorat-
ing trend. Core inflation is currently higher than
overall inflation because energy prices are falling,
but it is still below 1 percent, though the start of
the PSPP does seem to have had a short-lived
positive effect. 
In terms of perceptions, the information that
expectations convey is mixed. Figure 5 shows
long-term expectations (at the 5-year horizon)
from two different sources: a survey of profes-
sional forecasters and market expectations (swap
rates). The survey figures show that expectations
have been and remain both very stable as well as
at the level of the ECB’s inflation objective, below
but close to 2 percent. This indicates that profes-
sional forecasters believe that given enough time,
inflation will return to the definition of price sta-
bility. However, market expectations, at the same
horizon, show something different. The 5-year
inflation-linked swap rate shows a clear declining
trend (Figure 5). We interpret this difference to
mean two things: first, as these two series diverge,
this signals that confidence is starting to wane.
Second, the existence of this persistent wedge,
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figure 4: euro area overall HiCp annual growth rate (%)
Source: European Central Bank. Notes: 1) CBPP2; 2) “Whatever it takes’’*; 3) CBPP3; 4) ABSPP; 5) PSPP announcement; 6)
Start of PSPP; 7) CSPP and expansion of PSPP. * See notes to Figure 2. HICP = Harmonised index of consumer prices.
figure 5: inﬂation expectations: survey of professional forecasters and 5-year inﬂation-linked swap
rates 
Source: European Central Bank and Thomson Reuters Datastream. Notes: 1) “Whatever it takes’’*; 2) Announcement and
start of PSPP; 3) CSPP and expansion of PSPP. * See note to Figure 2.
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figure 7: euro-area gross ﬁxed capital formation (real year-on-year growth, %)
Source: Eurostat. Notes: 1) ‘’Whatever it takes’’*; 2) Announcement and start of PSPP. * See notes to Figure 2. 
monetary policy has had little visible effect on
inflation is the significant slack in the economy.
Euro-area unemployment has steadily but slowly
decreased from its peak of 12.1 percent in the
second quarter of 2013, reaching 10.3 percent in
Q1 2016 (Figure 8). Following the announcement
and start of the PSPP, the unemployment rate con-
tinued its gradual decrease but there does not
seem to have been a significant effect from QE on
the pace of unemployment reduction. The unem-
ployment rate is still very high compared to the
non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment
(NAIRU), the theoretical level of unemployment
below which inflation would start accelerating. 
4   tHe CHannels 
4.1 Bond yields
Euro-area government bond yields shot up during
the sovereign debt crisis of 2011, especially in the
periphery countries (in Spain and Italy, 10-year
bond yields reached 7.6 percent and 6.5 percent
respectively; Figure 9). The highest values were
attained in summer 2012, until President Draghi’s
famous “whatever it takes” speech (see note to
Figure 2). Since then bond yields have steadily
reduced except for a temporary increase in the
summer of 2015 during the Greek crisis. In fact,
this increase in bond yields coincided with the
first few months of the PSPP’s operation. There has
since been a gradual reduction in yields.
While bond yields declined both in the core and
periphery countries, periphery bond yields fell
faster after Draghi’s July 2012 “whatever it takes”
speech, thus compressing the spreads against
German bonds (Figure 10). However, the
announcement and start of the PSPP did not seem
to have a very strong effect on these spreads. 
4.2 Lending
We observed earlier that consumption and invest-
ment are picking up and are the two main contrib-
utors to GDP growth. The link to monetary policy
comes through credit creation. Figure 11 shows
that lending to non-financial corporations fell
steadily since 2012, before it stabilised in the
second half of 2015 following the start of the PSPP.
Lending to households has held up more robustly,
increasing since the announcement of the PSPP
from stagnation to a yearly growth rate of about 2
percent. This credit was mostly in the form of mort-
gages, which was helped by the stabilisation of, or
even the increase in, house prices. Credit, there-
fore, has been important in reversing and sus-
taining the contributions of consumption and
investment to growth.
4.3 Exchange rate
QE has likely had a significant effect on the
exchange rate. The USD/EUR exchange rate is now
significantly weaker (Figure 12). Compared to the
peak in 2014, the exchange rate is now down from
almost 1.4 to 1.12. Most of the decline happened
prior to the official announcement of the PSPP, but
in line with discussions about when and how the
ECB would start the PSPP. One factor that has sig-
nificantly affected the exchange rate during the
last year is monetary policy normalisation in the
United States. The divergence in monetary policy
across the Atlantic leads to capital flows which put
downwards pressure on the euro area’s effective
exchange rate. A weaker exchange rate facilitates
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notes to Figure 2.
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figure 9: 10-year government bond yields (%)
Source: Thomson Reuters. Notes: 1) “Whatever it takes’’*; 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and expansion
of PSPP. * See notes to Figure 2.
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figure 10: ten-year government bond spreads against Germany (%)
Source: Thomson Reuters. Notes: 1) ‘’Whatever it takes’’*; 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and expansion
of PSPP. * See notes to Figure 2.
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1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
Ja
n-
10
Ap
r-1
0
Ju
l-1
0
Oc
t-1
0
Ja
n-
11
Ap
r-1
1
Ju
l-1
1
Oc
t-1
1
Ja
n-
12
Ap
r-1
2
Ju
l-1
2
Oc
t-1
2
Ja
n-
13
Ap
r-1
3
Ju
l-1
3
Oc
t-1
3
Ja
n-
14
Ap
r-1
4
Ju
l-1
4
Oc
t-1
4
Ja
n-
15
Ap
r-1
5
Ju
l-1
5
Oc
t-1
5
Ja
n-
16
Ap
r-1
6
1 2 3 4
figure 12: usD/eur exchange rate
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. Notes: 1) “Whatever it takes’’*; 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and
expansion of PSPP. * See notes to Figure 2.
table 1: percentage point change of sovereign debt holdings 
between end-2014 and end- 2015 by institutional sector
resident banks Central Bank other public institutions other residents non-residents
Spain -6.10% 4.60% -0.10% -2.10% 3.70%
France -0.70% 6.40% 0.00% -3.30% -2.40%
Italy -1.20% 3.40% 0.00% -2.80% 0.60%
Germany* -0.30% 1.60% 0.00% 2.00% -3.30%
Source: Hüttl and Merler (2016), Bruegel sovereign bond holdings dataset; *Germany does not provide all the data up to
Q4 2015, so we calculate the % point change between Q4 2014 and Q2 2015 instead.
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exports and contributes to GDP by making domes-
tic goods relatively cheaper than foreign goods. 
4.4 Portfolio rebalancing
Portfolio rebalancing is perhaps the hardest QE
transmission channel to document. In principle,
one would want to observe that sellers of govern-
ment bonds to the ECB are then obliged to allocate
cash to riskier assets. In the euro area, it is impor-
tant to note that the ECB’s purchases of govern-
ment bonds from the balance sheets of banks
have been limited (Figure 12 and Table 1). Table 1
shows that only Spanish banks have sold govern-
ment bonds significantly. This is much less the
case for France, Italy and Germany, where other
residents or even non-residents have sold gov-
ernment bonds.
This suggests that portfolio rebalancing should
come primarily from non-banks. Unfortunately, we
do not have good data readily available on these
non-banks. 
5   tHe risks of Current MonetarY poliCY
Monetary policy, in its conventional form, affects
bank balance sheets through two channels. First,
are low interest rates leading banks to search for
yield? This implies that they might take bigger
risks by lending to riskier projects. Arguably, this is
unlikely to happen while the levels of private
debts remain high. The demand for new credit is
unlikely to pick up before the levels of private debt
reduce to lower and more sustainable levels. At
the same time, banks are still in the process of
repairing their balance sheets and are seeking to
conform to new regulatory requirements.
The second channel is banks’ profits. Banks want
to pass falling interest rates through to deposit
rates. This means that their cost of funding
reduces, which, all things being equal, increases
their profits. As banks see their profits increase
they are less likely to invest in risky projects
because they have more to lose. However, the sit-
uation is different when deposit rates are close to
zero. In reality banks are very reluctant to reduce
these rates to negative numbers, effectively
charging depositors, because that would encour-
age them to withdraw their money. As interest
rates reduce, banks instead see a squeeze on
their profits, which further restricts bank business.
In turn this undermines the creation of new credit
and the funding of new investments.
Unconventional monetary policy, in the form of
QE, aims directly at reducing the long-term yield
of assets. The term spread, or the spread between
long- and short-term bond yields for a given coun-
try, should thus have declined following the start
of the PSPP. As Figure 13 shows, the term spread
fell from very high levels in the periphery coun-
tries during 2013 and 2014, but increased after
the announcement and start of QE. The explana-
tion might be the uncertainty over negotiations
with Greece in summer 2015. As this subsided,
the term spread also fell. The term spread appears
to have increased a little since the ECB announce-
ment of the expansion of the PSPP in March 2016,
under which monthly purchases were increased
and corporate bonds were included. 
Overall, a fall in the term premium affects banks’
profitability to the extent that banks transform
short-term deposits into long-term loans. Figure
14 shows the positive correlation between term
spreads and bank lending spreads, suggesting
that QE does influence profitability. 
Furthermore, Figure 15 shows that the spread
between lending and deposit rates in the euro area
as a whole has been reducing since the beginning
of 2014. While these developments reflect lower
lending rates which are helpful in an economy
with little lending, they also indicate declining
bank profitability. This can be a problem if these
conditions remain for a long period. In fact, the
lending-deposit spread of France’s banks has
been very low for four years now, and below zero
at times. 
Housing markets could be another area in which
financial risks could emerge. Figure 16 shows the
evolution of mortgage loans in the euro area.
These were growing at a rate of 5 percent annually
at their peak in April 2016, after which growth rates
fell to negative values in 2014 until they picked
up around the time of the announcement and start
of the PSPP.
House price developments have however been
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figure 15: lending-deposit rate spread (%)
Source: European Central Bank.
Note: 1) “Whatever it takes’’ 2) PSPP Announcement 3) Start of PSPP. See notes to Figure 2.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1/1/2010 1/1/2011 1/1/2012 1/1/2013 1/1/2014 1/1/2015 1/1/2016
France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain
3 421
figure 13: Government bond term spreads(10 year yields – 1 year yields) (%)
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very different across the euro area (Figure 17). As
a whole, the euro area's house price index is now
at roughly the same level as in 2010, and seems
to have picked up following the announcement
and start of the PSPP. Different countries, however,
have seen very different developments in their
housing markets. In Spain, which experienced a
large housing bubble before the crisis, house
prices continuously fell between 2007 and 2013,
and have stayed fairly constant since then. Italy
and the Netherlands have also seen corrections
to their housing markets, but these have been less
severe than in Spain. House prices in Germany
and Belgium have been growing steadily and do
not seem to have been overly affected by the
crisis. Finally, it seems that house prices have
been growing in the all countries shown except
Italy since the start of the PSPP. 
There has therefore been some effect in terms of
generating new lending primarily for households,
consistent with a general recovery in housing
markets. On the corporate side however, there is
still close to no new lending. The European
Commission estimates that most euro-area
countries have at least one sector that requires a
reduction in debt of at least 10 percent (Bricongne
et al, 2016). This inevitably reduces the demand
for new credit, despite ample supply. We expect
therefore that the low interest rate environment
and the availability of liquidity in the system will
not pose financial risks as long as the process of
deleveraging continues. 
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figure 16: euro area monetary and ﬁnancial institutions (excluding esCB) lending for house
purchase (year-on-year growth, %)
Source: European Central Bank. Note: 1) “Whatever it takes’’*; 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and
expansion of PSPP. ESCB= European System of Central Banks. * See notes to Figure 2.
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figure 17: House price index (index, 2010=100)
Source: Eurostat. Notes: 1) “Whatever it takes’’*; 2) Announcement and start of PSPP. * See notes to Figure 2.
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figure 20: iBoxx total market value of the corporate investment grade bonds (€ billions)
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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figure 19: net issues (ﬂows) of securities other than shares, excluding ﬁnancial derivatives
(nominal value, non-ﬁnancial corporations, € billions)
Source: European Central Bank. 
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figure 18: stock market price index (Dow Jones euro stoxx 50 price index)
Source: European Central Bank. Note: 1) “Whatever it takes’’*; 2) PSPP announcement; 3) Start of PSPP; 4) CSPP and
expansion of PSPP. ESCB= European System of Central Banks. * See notes to Figure 2
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Finally, between Draghi’s “whatever it takes”
speech and right after the start of QE, stock mar-
kets values have increased (Figure 18). After that,
however they have been declining. This reflects,
among other things, increased uncertainty on
world markets and, in 2016, uncertainty coming
from China.
6   More Qe: tHe eXpanDeD puBliC seCtor
purCHase proGraMMe (pspp) anD tHe
Corporate seCtor purCHase proGraMMe
(Cspp)
It is a little too early to judge the effects of the
ECB’s decision to expand government bond pur-
chases from March 2016. Inflation is still hover-
ing around zero and the government bond term
spread has increased a little and stabilised.
In its latest action of purchasing corporate bonds,
which started on 8 June, the ECB’s intervention is
much more targeted. The Corporate Sector Pur-
chase Programme (CSPP) involves outright pur-
chase of investment grade euro-denominated
bonds issued by non-bank corporations in the
euro-area, and carried out by central banks in Bel-
gium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Finland.
Purchases are conducted both in primary and sec-
ondary markets; primary market purchases will not
involve any purchases by public undertakings.
Figure 11 shows that credit to non-financial cor-
porations, having been negative since 2012, has
only recently stabilised broadly around zero. This
implies that banks’ net lending to firms has not
increased in four years2. And since banks are still
very much in the process of building up capital to
satisfy the new regulatory requirements, it is
unlikely that they will issue significant new credit.
The ECB is therefore aiming to reach the corporate
sector directly by bypassing the banks. 
Bypassing the banks at the current juncture might
be useful but it is not sufficient. For this measure
to be successful, the corporate sector needs to
funnel the money it borrows to the real economy.
If the money borrowed from the ECB is used for
deleveraging, there will not be a beneficial effect
on the economy in the short run (although there
will eventually, as corporates become stronger).
The ECB’s rationale is to take on the risk that banks
are currently unable or unwilling to take.  
There is some evidence that corporates have
sought to take advantage of the ECB decision by
issuing a greater amount of securities following
the March 2016 announcement (Figure 19).
The total market value of the corporate investment
grade bonds has increased substantially since
then, in particular for high-rated bonds (Figure 20). 
At the same time, bank profitability has once again
been put under pressure because corporate
yields have been depressed. Irrespective of the
outcome of this intervention by the ECB, the role of
the central bank as a ‘financial intermediary’
needs to be both an exception and short-lived.
Lending to firms needs to be the outcome of a
market mechanism. The ECB’s intervention is
therefore a significant market distortion. It is nec-
essary given the current conditions, but a distor-
tion nonetheless.
ConClusions
Since the end of 2014, inflation has been at or
very close to zero. With very little ability to move
the actual interest rate further into negative terri-
tory, the ECB has resorted to unconventional
measures. The latest of these includes a pro-
gramme to purchase corporate bonds, which
started on 8 June 2016.
Monetary policy so far has helped extend new
credit to the euro-area economy and has posi-
tively contributed to growth. These effects are vis-
ible but small relative to the size and type of
monetary policy interventions. There are no infla-
tionary risks while slack continues to exist in the
euro area. At the same time, we do not see any
immediate financial risks arising from excessive
debt as long as there is a need to reduce existing
levels of debt to lower and more productive levels. 
Quantitative easing can pose risks to the prof-
itability of banks, a factor that could hamper the
creation of new credit. This risk would increase if
banks do not divert to other business models, a
reason why European banking supervision has
called for revisions to business models (Nouy,
2016). While a correction of bank margins was
2. There are significant
differences between
countries. In Germany,
Finland and France new
credit was issued to non-
financial corporations
during the course of 2015.
But credit in Italy and partic-
ularly Spain remains in
negative territory. 
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probably inevitable, the longer this pressure
exists, the greater the threat to financial interme-
diation.
Draghi’s “whatever it takes” speech was a critical
turning point for the euro area. This was suffi-
ciently convincing to remove risks to the system’s
financial stability. The QE that followed has helped
to sustain progress made since then. Investment,
employment and growth continue to move in a
positive direction. At the same time, QE has made
an important contribution to lowering the
exchange rate (aided also by US monetary
policy). Given the underlying uncertainties about
the global economy, it is difficult to imagine how
this result would have been attained without such
aggressive intervention. Also, confidence appears
to have stabilised with bond yields and spread
volatility substantially lower and more stable. Mar-
kets still have faith that the ECB is able to manage
inflation, given enough time. However, this confi-
dence is beginning to wane given the scale and
unconventional nature of the measures taken and
the absence of inflation. It is unlikely that confi-
dence will be sustained for long in the absence of
a visible increase in aggregate demand and infla-
tion. Given also that the marginal benefits of more
central bank action are disputable, more of the
required stimulus would have to come from else-
where. This includes better use of fiscal space
where it is available and more effective resolution
of unproductive debt.
